Thus,wedefinedthreevolumescalculations:
Sandwichvolume:Onlycountedthevictimsvolumethatgotcaughtinthesandwichattack
Arbitragevolume:CalculatedthevolumeforCurveliquiditypoolsonlyandexcludedvolumefromothervenues
Totalvolumeforarbitrageandsandwichbotstransactions:calculatedthevolumeforbothMEVtypesfromarbitragevolumeandsandwichvolume.
Figure7showsthetotalvolumecontributionfromarbitrageandsandwichbotstransactionsduringtheperiodfromJune1sttoOct31st.
Figure7:Totalvolumefromarbitrageandsandwichbotstransactions
Wecouldnoticeagappyphenomenoninthevolumeplot—thetotalvolumefellsharplyinJuly,withrecoveredgrowthinAugustandSeptember.
ArbitragevolumeandvolumefromtotalMEVbotstransactionshaddifferentvolumetrends.InJuly,thearbitragevolumeexhibitedhigherdrop,whichindicatesthatarbitragebotswerelessactivebecauseoftheoverallmarketconditions,suchashighertransactionfeesevaluatedbyEthereumgasprices.ThetotalvolumeofMEVtransactionsweremorestablecomparedtothearbitragevolumedespiteinthefallingtrend.
Asabovementioned,MEVbotstransactinthetradingvolumecompositely,influencingthetotalvolumeevenwhenitwasajointcontributionofdifferentbehavioralpatterns.WefurtherexpandedthisinvestigationintotemporaldistributionandvolumefrequencyanalysisforbothMEVtypes.
Conclusions
CurveisadeFiinfrastructureoperatingforstablecoinmetricswithuniquefeaturesandsupportedbythreetypesofliquiditypools.The3-tokenpoolanduniquepricecurvecanononlyreducefinancialrisksinherentinstablecoinsbutalsodeliverlesservicetocustomerswithlowerfeesandslippage.CurvedoesfaceMEVattacks,buthasgeneratedsignificantrevenuefrombotinterference.WeobservedequalinterestintheMEVmarketfrombotharbitrageandsandwichagents.Afterfilteringoutnon-Curvevolumedata,weobservedthatbotswerelessactiveinJulyduetohighEthereumgaspricesandoverallbearishmarketconditions.However,onestableobservationisbothMEVtypesgeneratedsignificantrevenuecomparedtothetotalrevenuegeneratedbyCurvepoolsthemselves.
Weshowedthroughouranalysisofthetotalvolumefromarbitrageandsandwichbotstransactionsthatarbitragetakesthemajorityofthevolumeduetothefactthatakeyparameterformarketfluctuations—pricechange—isoneofthefoundationalfeatureofarbitrageprofitopportunities.Sandwichattacks,however,arespreadoutsituationsanddonotdirectlyinflictthedecisivemarketimpact.Inmostcases,theytargetuserswithlessexpressivenaturewhencomparedtoarbitragebots.
Fromthevolumefrequencyanalysis,thesandwichattacksarefoundtohaveahighervolumepertransaction.Butduetothespreadoutnatureofthesandwichattackswecouldnoticeadecliningsandwichpercentageinthesummedtransfersofthatmeantotaltransactionevents.Basedontheseobservations,resilientdesignagainstbothMEVtypesisnecessary.Formoredetails,pleasereferencethemainbodyofthereport.
Overall,wehopeourreportwillprovidevaluableinsightsforstakeholdersandresearchersinterms ofthestrategiesagainstMEVactivitiesandhowwecanimprovetheefficiencyofpricediscoveryinAMMmarkets.
